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ABSTRACT
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general method for agents to learn optimal
control policies through exploration and experience. Due to its generality, RL
can generate novel policies that may not be easily expressed with rules-based
strategies or traditional control techniques. Over the years since its inception,
RL has been able to solve increasingly more challenging control problems,
from GridWorld to Go. Despite these impressive results, the successes of RL
have been predominantly limited to systems with discrete environments and
agents, particularly video and board games.
A key barrier to using RL in safety-critical cyber-physical system appli-
cations is not only transferring these results to continuous domains but also
ensuring that a notion of ‘safety’ is upheld during the learning process. This
thesis highlights some of the recent contributions in safe learning and presents
a framework, FoRShield, for learning safe policies of a control system with
nonlinear dynamics. The framework develops a generic hybrid systems model
for online RL. The model is used to formalize a shield that can filter unsafe
action choices and proved feedback to the underlying RL system.
The thesis presents a concrete approach for computing the shield utiliz-
ing existing reachability analysis tools. The feasibility of this approach is
illustrated against a case study with a quadcopter that uses RL to discover
a safe and optimal plan for a dynamic fire-fighting task. The approach is
realized as an open-source framework, FoRShield. The framework is imple-
mented in Python in a modular fashion to allow for testing of a variety of
algorithms. Our particular implementation utilizes the Actor-Critic algo-
rithm to learn policies. The experiments show that interesting fire-fighting
strategies can be safely learned for a discrete environment with 232 states
and a 9-dimensional plant model using a standard laptop computer.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The field of AI, particularly machine learning (ML) and reinforcement learn-
ing (RL), has enjoyed exponential investment and growth in the past few
years. We now interact with numerous AI algorithms every day through
email spam filters, recommendations systems, news curation applications,
etc. Slowly, these AI algorithms are encroaching into the territory of cyber-
physical systems (CPS) products such as critical infrastructures, robotics,
supply chain, aviation, and most notably self-driving cars.
Almost all car manufacturers these days along with numerous other large
companies and start-ups are either developing autonomous vehicle capabili-
ties in-house or creating partnerships to gain access to such capabilities. A
subset of these companies have developed viable prototypes and have started
testing them out in the real-world. Testing autonomous vehicle prototypes
outside of simulation environments and in the real-world offers a wealth of
information, but there are enormous consequences when these autonomous
systems fail. Two notable accidents [1, 2] resulted in fatalities and even par-
tially halted any further testing in the real-world [3]. Although the use of
AI black boxes in fully autonomous vehicles and cyber-physical systems in
general may provide many potential benefits to humanity, the challenges of
safety and security are yet to be met.
As an increasing number of cyber-physical systems begin to either incorpo-
rate or replace existing modules with AI modules, methodologies to formally
reason about these modules become crucial. A key challenge in applying
AI, whether it be ML or RL, to CPS products lies in specifying a degree
of correctness for the system and verifying that this correctness holds. The
processes utilized for developing, training, and updating AI modules are rad-
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ically different from those used for traditional software and cyber-physical
systems. Not surprisingly, the traditional tool-chains and methodologies do
not suit AI algorithms and modules particularly well.
At the traditional methodologies end of the spectrum, the approaches rely
heavily on formulating well-defined mathematical models to reason about
various properties of systems. These carefully crafted mathematical models
are subjected to model checking and to theorem provers to mathematically
guarantee that certain properties have been met. Even though such rigorous
approaches yield definite results, creating mathematical formulations may
not be a straightforward process.
The other end of the spectrum relies on the ‘brute force’ approach where
a system is exhaustively tested against all possible cases. This approach will
also certify a truth, but is severely limited by the size of the set of cases.
Current verification strategies for AI modules seem to have opted for this
approach. As a case in point, several autonomous vehicle manufacturers
announced the total miles logged by their vehicles as a proof of safety of
their autonomous systems [4, 5]. Although total logged miles may seem
a good indicator of safety through the lenses of arguments such as PAC
learning, “when a metric is used as a target, it ceases to be a good metric”
[6]. Such simple metrics make it easy to judge the approximate safety of
AI modules in general, but fail to quantify the true safety of the system.
Certain companies like Righthook.io make claims such as “11,000,000,000
miles are needed to reach statistical confidence an autonomous vehicle has
exceeded human driving by 20%” [7]. Yet, considering the numbers logged
by manufacturers and the performance of their autonomous vehicles, these
claims of super-human driving ability are comically meaningless. The brute
force approach provides a quick way to analyze AI modules but in the end,
“program testing can be used very effectively to show the presence of bugs
but never to show their absence” [8].
Currently, the technical challenges of verifying AI modules are being ad-
dress by two broad research efforts. The first effort targets analysis and
verification of individual AI modules. For example, neural network (NN)
image classifiers show promise on real-world data sets [9] but they are known
to be fundamentally fragile to adversarial examples [10]. There is a growing
body of research on testing networks and hardening them against adversarial
example attacks [10].
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The second line of research addresses the problem of end-to-end testing and
verification systems that use AI modules. In [11], the authors make a case
for using the system-level specifications for guiding the search for adversarial
examples in ML. A fault injection-based resiliency assessment system for
autonomous vehicles is presented in [12]. Along similar lines, [13] presents
a fault injection framework to assess the resilience of openpilot [14], under
different environmental conditions and sensor faults.
1.2 Thesis Overview
The major contributions of this thesis fall into the latter category of address-
ing the holistic verification of AI modules. Our work considers system-level
safety verification of a CPS in which a key decision making module is de-
veloped (trained) with RL. We present a framework, FoRShield, that uses
the Actor-Critic RL algorithm to simultaneously verify the actions of an
agent with continuous dynamics in a discrete environment. The framework
relies on a generic hybrid model of a control system that is defined by a
learned high-level planner through RL and an underlying low-level controller
for achieving the individual decisions suggested by the planner. The hybrid
formalism enables us to clearly specify the semantics of the overall system and
helps identify the information flow through the different modules involved.
Our problem setting involves a hierarchical control system: a low-level
controller drives the system to near-term goals or waypoints, and a high-
level controller or planner chooses the sequence of goals to accomplish a
longer term mission. We consider situations, where existing control design
techniques (for example, PID, LQR, MPC, etc.) are adequate for designing
the low-level controller, but the design for the planner is challenging. This is a
common scenario where the planner has to optimize for multiple objectives to
accomplish the overall mission and simultaneously adhere to the constraints
imposed by the low-level planner.
The hybrid model formulation is used to define a shield, a protective struc-
ture that can filter unsafe action choices both online throughout the learning
process and oﬄine during execution. Additionally, the shield provides feed-
back to the RL algorithm by penalizing it for selecting unsafe actions with a
very negative reward. If there exist safe paths in the environment, then the
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system is guaranteed to converge to a policy with no unsafe actions.
The continuous agent and the environment together form the MDP of the
RL problem. The dynamics of the continuous agent are used by the shield
to verify that proposed actions are safe with respect to the environment. An
overview of the complete framework is presented in Figure 1.1. Additionally,
we present a method to reuse reachability analysis computations for agents
with translation invariant dynamics.
Figure 1.1: Illustration of modules in an RL-based control system and the
information flow between them
We evaluate FoRShield against a case study of autonomous drone fire fight-
ing. The drone in the case study is defined by a 9-dimensional continuous
dynamics model derived from [15]. In the case study, the objective of the
drone is to extinguish a fire within a grid environment as efficiently as pos-
sible while minimizing the spread of fire and the chances of collision with
obstacles. To this end, the high-level planner has to decide the location and
direction for approaching the fire (which may change over time); it has to
choose sources for collecting water and schedule collection; it has to avoid
obstacles.
Finally, we compare our shield against two baseline methods and demon-
strate that our framework is capable of learning safe and near optimal fire-
fighting policies for an agent with continuous nonlinear dynamics. In the
various scenarios we tested, the policies learned by the agents through our
framework were guaranteed to be safe and prevented the agent from entering
any unsafe states
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1.3 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are:
1. An up-to-date literature review of research in the areas related to safe
AI and formal verification in the AI community
2. A framework that formalizes RL-based control systems as hybrid sys-
tems
3. A proposal for shields for non-linear plant models and deep-learning-
based RL algorithms in conjunction with existing hybrid verification
techniques
4. An experimental feasibility test of our approach on an interesting case
study
5. An implementation of the framework available on request
1.4 Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. A survey of recent con-
tributions in the area of safe RL is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 intro-
duces a framework for modeling systems as a hybrid automaton. Chapter 4
presents the fire-fighting case study. Our implementation of the shield us-
ing reachability analysis along with the FoRShield framework is introduced in
Chapter 5. The experimental results and implementation details are outlined
in Chapter 6. Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and suggests possible
future lines of research.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK ON SAFE RL
In this chapter, we present an short overview of safe RL works related to our
framework FoRShield. Section 2.1 provides definitions of concepts that will
be used in the literature survey and in later chapters. Section 2.2 recounts
the recent history of AI and how it evolved into its current state. Sections
2.3 and 2.4 each cover a unique approach to safe RL and describe several
works based on that approach.
2.1 Background
A probability distribution over a finite set X is a function µ : X → [0, 1] ⊆ R
with
∑
x∈X µ(x) = µ(X) = 1. The set of all distributions on X is denoted
by Distr(X).
A Markov decision process (MDP) is a tuple M = 〈S, sI ,A,P ,R〉 where
1. s ∈ S is a finite set of states
2. sI is the set of initial states
3. a ∈ A is the finite set of states
4. P : S ×A → Distr(S) is a state transition probability function
5. R : S ×A× S → R is an immediate reward function.
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a class of algorithms that allows agents
in a particular and possibly unknown environment to learn optimal policies
through trial and error by maximizing (or minimizing) a predefined reward
(or cost) function. Environments in RL are typically formulated as MDPs.
The agent and the environment interact with each other in a cyclical fashion.
At a particular time t, the agent observes the state of the environment st ∈ S
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and chooses an action at ∈ A. The environment evolves to state st+1 ∈ S with
probability P(st+1|st, at) and returns an immediate reward R(st, at, st+1).
The agent utilizes the immediate returned reward to compute the cumulative
total return R =
∑T
t=0 γrt where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor used to control
the influence of future immediate rewards. By maximizing the expectation of
the total return, maxpi∈Π Epi[R], the agent is able to learn an optimal policy
pi∗ from the set of all policies pi ∈ Π : S → A.
The most basic RL algorithms, policy iteration and value iteration, utilize
tables to store a value for either each state or each state-action pair defined
by an MDP. These algorithms iteratively recompute each of the values in the
table according to an update function until all the values converge to some
constant. However, for certain problems whose MDPs contain extremely
large state-spaces, it may be prohibitive or infeasible to create enormous
tables. An alternative to using tables is to use function approximators as
estimators for the values of either states or state-action pairs [16]. Function
approximators such as neural networks can achieve performance similar to
that of tabular methods while using significantly less memory. The class of
RL algorithms that utilize neural function approximators is called deep RL
(DRL).
Neural networks (NNs) are universal function approximators that are formed
by creating a network of consecutively layered neurons. Given a function
y = f(x), NNs are able to model y = g(x) such that g(x) ≈ f(x). Input
is fed into the network via the input layer. The input layer passes on the
input to the hidden layer(s) where it is processed by a system of weighted
connections. The final hidden layer is linked to an output layer which yields
the final output. Each layer in the network yields a vector of values, i.e.
yi = σi(Wixi + bi) where i refers to the ith layer in the network, xi is the
output from the previous layer, Wi are the weights of the neurons in the
layer, bi is the bias, and σi is the activation function. Every neuron in a
layer contains an activation function whose primary function is make an NN
nonlinear. There is a wide variety of activation functions to chose from, and
different layers in the network may use different activation functions.
The backpropagation algorithm is a gradient descent method used to train
a network of neurons through the use of gradients [17]. A loss function is
defined at the output layer that compares the actual output of the network
with an actual output. As the results of the loss function are distributed
7
backwards throughout the network’s layers, the weights on the connections
between neurons of neighboring layers are updated accordingly.
Safe RL can generally be defined as a “process of learning policies that
maximize the expectation of the return in problems in which it is important
to ensure reasonable system performance and/or respect safety constraints
during the learning and/or deployment processes” [18]. It is a similar ap-
proach to RL except it considers additional safety constraints and strives to
find optimal policies that satisfy these constraints. Policies learned through
safe RL should be verifiable and certifiable for critical systems such as CPS.
2.2 Recent History of AI
Starting in the early 2000s, the AI community underwent a resurgence as
some important hurdles were overcome and more powerful hardware became
readily available. One such major hurdle was the vanishing gradient descent
problem [19] which prevents the earlier layers of deeper neural networks from
receiving the back-propagated error and updating the weights of these layers
in a meaningful way. It was discovered [20, 21] that this was not a funda-
mental problem with neural networks; rather it was an issue with applying
gradient based learning methods to some classes of activation functions such
as sigmoid and tanh. Moreover, the creation of extremely large data sets
such as ImageNet [22] allowed researchers to focus on optimization problems
rather than tedious data collection, and provided a baseline against which
everyone could compare their results. Competitions sponsored by prominent
conferences around these data sets promoted healthy competition among re-
searches and brought about noteworthy architectures like AlexNet [23], VGG
[24], GoogleNet [25], and ResNet [26], each contributing new techniques to
the proverbial AI table.
These breakthroughs in the machine learning community, particularly re-
garding image tasks, enabled impressive results in other AI communities such
as reinforcement learning. The application of deep neural networks as func-
tion approximators coupled with asynchronous RL algorithms and significant
compute power allowed researchers to solve a suite of Atari games with scores
better than those of human counterparts [27]. These new methodologies were
applied to increasingly complicated games involving much larger state spaces
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and requiring strategies spanning extended time horizons such as Go [28],
DotA [29], StarCraft [30]. The learned agents in the first two listed game
environments were able to compete and even defeat the top-ranked profes-
sional players. As a real-time strategy game, StarCraft can be considered
one of the hardest environments in the video game domain. There has been
some initial progress creating modest agents, but new advancements will be
required to conquer this game along with a few other remaining bastions.
Even though impressive results have been achieved year after year in the AI
communities, most of the previously mentioned approaches have forgone up-
holding safety constraints. Notably, neural networks have been shown to be
susceptible to adversarial attacks. These attacks modify the input in imper-
ceptible ways such that a human cannot distinguish between the original and
modified versions. However, deep learning algorithms will incorrectly classify
the modified examples with high probabilities [31]. Similarly, this oversight
is evident in reinforcement learning where agents are repeatedly exposed to
dangerous conditions during the training process. Such exposure may not
always be feasible to agents situated outside sand-boxed game environments
where mistakes are inconsequential. Furthermore, there are no guarantees
that agents trained in this fashion will not violate some constraints. As more
AI works are integrated into safety-critical systems, it becomes a necessity
that there exist methods for verifying AI black boxes and ensuring that off-
the-shelf AI components meet predefined specifications.
Several comprehensive surveys detail the recent literature for safe AI [18,
32, 33]. This chapter seeks to complement these works with a brief survey
of safe reinforcement learning literature, particularly detailing works most
similar to our approach described in later chapters.
2.3 Shield Learning
One approach to safe RL is to limit the actions of an agent to only a safe
subset and utilize RL to learn a safe policy. A shield is such a construct
that determines which set of actions is safe. The works below present several
approaches to synthesizing shields.
In [34], the authors propose an approach for learning optimal policies while
enforcing safety properties expressed in temporal logic, particularly linear
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temporal logic (LTL). The work introduces shield learning, a learning strat-
egy augmented by a synthesized reactive system that prevents an agent from
executing unsafe actions in an environment. The shield is inserted into the
traditional RL setting loop in one of two suggested positions. In the first
position, the shield reduces the complete action set at each state to those
actions that are definitely safe. In the second position, the shield monitors
an agent’s selected actions and corrects them if necessary. To synthesize a
shield, the product is taken between a provided safety specification formu-
lated in LTL and an abstraction of the environment to construct a notion of
a game that is similar to that of an MDP. This construction is then used to
learn safe optimal policies. One downside of this approach is that it relies
on an omniscient model to determine the set of unsafe states at each state.
Such an all-knowing model may not be readily available or even feasible.
An alternative approach to shield construction is proposed by the authors
of [35] who consider the notion of a scheduler to limit the action set of an
agent. The objective is to find a optimal scheduler that satisfies the spec-
ified safety constraints and that simultaneously minimizes (or maximizes)
the expected cost (reward) to reach a goal state. Specifications are encoded
as temporal logic constraints in the form of probabilistic computation tree
login (PCTL) properties and are a combination of a reachability property,
P≤λ(T ), and an expected cost property, E≤κ(G). The reachability prop-
erty upper-bounds the probability of eventually reaching a set of states T to
be ≤ λ. Similarly, the expected cost property upper-bounds the expected
cost of eventually reaching the set of states G. Given these safety proper-
ties, the paper describes an algorithm for finding a safe optimal policy as
follows. First, the environment MDP in conjunction with the reachability
property is reformulated into an SMT encoding. Next, this SMT encoding is
passed into an SMT solver to synthesize a safe permissive scheduler which is
actually a subset of the original environment MDP that adheres to the reach-
ability property. Then, traditional RL algorithms are run on this sub-MDP
to discover safe policies. Finally, the resultant expected cost is compared
against the specified expected cost to see whether an optimal policy has
been discovered. If not, another SMT encoding is formulated that excludes
the previous schedulers. Although this approach can output safe policies, it
essentially boils down to a brute-force method that will try a copious num-
ber of schedulers. The authors briefly acknowledge this incremental nature
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of their algorithm and suggest possible improvements.
The above authors expand on their work in [36] and apply their work to
the more complicated problem of PAC-man. The major differences between
this work and the previous work is synthesis of the shield. A similar reach-
ability property is considered as before, P≥λ(T ), but it lower-bounds the
probability of eventually reaching the set of states T . To synthesize a shield,
an action-valuation is evaluated for every action in every state to determine
the maximal probabilities of satisfying the safety property. Such a formula-
tion may not be tractable, so the authors limit the probability computation
to a finite horizon. Given the complete set of probabilities, a subset of the
environment MDP can be formulated that satisfies the reachability property.
The authors implement their algorithm and experiment against the PAC-man
environment. Even though the implemented approach was unable to guar-
antee complete safety, it was able to decrease training times by preventing
the agent from dying as often as it would without the presence of a shield.
2.4 Sketching
Rather than synthesizing shields that can reduce the complete set of actions
to a subset of safe actions, sketching approaches can synthesize a policy di-
rectly in a human-readable output. The outputs generated through sketching
can be verified with established traditional verification methodologies.
Such an approach is considered by the authors of [37] who propose VIPER,
an algorithm that combines ideas from model compression and imitation
learning to learn decision tree policies through policy extraction. The bene-
fits of decisions tree are that they are nonparametric so they are capable of
representing complex policies comparable to those of deep neural networks
(DNNs) and they are efficiently verifiable through existing methodologies.
The extraction technique utilizes imitation learning of high-performing DNN
policies to guide the training, particularly DAGGER [38]. The reason for gen-
erating decision tree policies through supervised learning rather than direct
learning is that DNNs are better regularized and easier to train, especially
with gradient descent methods. To leverage both the action and cumulative
reward output by a DNN, the authors extend DAGGER to Q-DAGGER and
additionally modify Q-DAGGER to output decision tree policies in VIPER.
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The output policies can then be verified with methodologies such as sum-of-
squares (SOS) or satisfiability (SAT) optimization.
Another sketching approach is outlined in [39]. The authors propose
a learning framework called programmatically interpretable reinforcement
learning (PIRL). This framework is parameterized by a high-level program-
ming language for policies whose semantics consist of atoms and sequences
of atoms. The suggested language may be represented compactly and canon-
ically to facilitate searching over the space of programs. To find an optimal
program, the authors first utilize deep reinforcement learning to find a policy
that will serve as an approximation for searching for a programmatic pol-
icy. The algorithm then uses an imitation learning approach to iteratively
searches through a set of program templates with the use of Bayesian opti-
mization to find optimal parameters for the templates and generates a pool
of template candidates. These candidates are simulated against the environ-
ment and the total rewards are gathered. This procedure will iterate until
none of the candidates return a higher reward than the current maximum.
The authors test their framework against a few classic control problems in RL
and TORCS, a driving simulator, and verify that the generated policies ad-
here to their defined safety specifications. A domain expert may be required
to develop the programming language constructs from which the generated
policies will be formulated and to guide the learning process.
The author’s of [40] build upon the two works introduced above by wrap-
ping them inside a overarching framework, mixed optimization scheme for
reinforcement learning (MORL), for synthesizing policies with repairing ca-
pabilities. To synthesize an optimal policy, the framework first starts with
an initial policy pi0 and uses synthesis techniques similar those discussed
previously to learn a symbolic representation of a learned policy as a pro-
gram P0. With this programmatic representation, it is possible to perform
program repair either manually by a human expert or automatically using
safety specification constraints to remove or add certain behaviors. The re-
paired program P ′0 is then transferred into an improved policy pi
′
0 that is
further improved with standard gradient descent. Once a minima is reached,
the policy pi′0 becomes pi0 for the next iteration if necessary. The complete
procedure can be visualized as pit → Pt → P ′t → pi′t → pit+1 where t is the
loop counter. The MORL framework improves on the above works by uti-
lizing repetitive optimization of programs to converge to optimal solution.
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However, it may be vulnerable to converging to less optimal solutions if the
repaired programs are worse then the original generated program.
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Chapter 3
LEARNING-BASED CONTROL SYSTEMS
MODEL
We consider a system consisting of an agent acting on an environment based
on the directions of a (high-level) planner . The planner’s mission is to drive
the environment to a target state by setting intermediate goals for the agent.
The planner will be learned using RL. The agent has a (low-level) controller
that can achieve any of these intermediate goals chosen by the planner. In the
example fire-fighting application we discuss in Chapter 4, the agent is a drone
that moves in a 3D world to collect and deploy water; the environment is a
2D map of a spreading wildfire, water sources, and possibly other obstacles
available from sensors. The planner’s mission is to douse the fire, and to this
end it sets goals for the drone to move and collect and deploy water.
In order to learn a planner online, we will use a learner and a shield. The
shield forward analyzes a goal proposed by the planner to evaluate whether
it is safe to pursue from the current state of the agent. The learner uses this
output from the shield and the state to update the planner.
In the rest of this chapter, we develop a complete formal model of the
hybrid system parameterized by all these components—agent, environment,
shield, learner, and planner. Each planner goal is considered as a separate
mode in the hybrid automaton. In every mode, the agent state evolves
according to a differential equation (determined by the low-level controller).
There are three types of discrete transitions. First, the environment state
is updated periodically independent of the agent (env transitions). Second,
when the agent achieves a goal, the environment, the agent, the planner, and
the goal are updated (pln transitions). If the goal is not safe, immediately,
the planner gets updated and a new safe goal is set by the new planner (repln
transition). This last type of transition may occur several times before a safe
goal is found. Figure 1.1 shows the key pieces of the hybrid automaton.
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3.1 Agent, Environment, and Planner
Formally, let Sa = Rn be the continuous state space of the agent for some
n ∈ N, and let Oa be the set of observable states of the agent. Let Obs :
Sa → Oa and Obs−1 : Oa → 2Sa be the (invertible) state observation map
and its inverse.
Let Se be the discrete state space of the environment (as sensed by the
agent). We define O = Oa × Se to be the set of observable states.
Let G be the finite set of modes or goals that can be chosen by the planner.
A planner is a function Pl : O × G → G that maps an observed state of
the agent, an observed state of the environment (as seen by the agent), and
a (current) goal to a new goal. We imagine this to be a complicated function
that is going to be learned using RL with runtime state observations. We
denote the set of all possible planners by P .
As we shall see in Section 3.4, the state space of the hybrid automaton
describing the overall system will be Q = Sa × Se × G⊥ × P , where G⊥ =
G ∪ {⊥}. The ⊥ value will indicate that a goal has not been decided by the
planner. For a state q ∈ Q, we denote the first, second, third, and fourth
elements by q.Sa, q.Se, q.G, q.P , respectively. We call q a system state. A
(bounded) trajectory ξ for Q is a map from an interval of [0, T ] to Q, for
some T ≥ 0. We denote its domain by ξ.dom, its first state ξ(0) by ξ.fstate,
and its last state ξ(T ) by ξ.lstate. A trajectory ξ with ξ.dom = [0, 0] is called
a point trajectory.
3.2 Environment and Agent Updates
The environment of the agent evolves dynamically independent of the agent,
but its effects are seen by the agent through periodically updating sensors.
These updates are captured by a (possibly nondeterministic) function En :
Se → 2Se , which we call the environment update function.
A guard Grd : G → 2Sa maps each goal g ∈ G to a set of agent states
that correspond to accomplishing that goal. An agent-environment joint
update function AE : Sa × Se × G → Sa × Se gives the (joint) new state
of the environment and the agent after the agent accomplishes a goal. As
the name suggests, only this function captures the interactions of the agent
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and the environment. For example, when the fire-fighting drone arrives at a
fire location and deploys water, this function updates the water-level in the
drone and also updates the environment with a new (lower) level of fire.
3.3 Shield and Learner
The system-level requirements are specified by two sets: a mission target set
S∗e ⊆ Se and a set of unsafe states U ⊆ Sa × Se. U ′ is the lifting of U to Q.
That is, q ∈ U ′ iff q.(Sa × Se) ∈ U . We will write U instead of U ′ when the
type is clear from context.
With a fixed unsafe set U , a shield takes as input a current (observed)
state of the agent, state of the environment, and a candidate planned goal,
and decides whether or not this goal is a safe one to pursue for the agent.
Thus, the shield is a function of the type, Sh : O ×G→ {safe, unsafe}.
A learner updates the current planner with a new planner based on the
current observed state (of agent and environment) and the current goal, with
the objective of achieving mission target while preserving safety. Thus, it is
a function of the type Le : P ×O ×G⊥ → P .
3.4 System-level Hybrid Automaton
Given all of the above sets and maps, now we are ready to define the hybrid
automaton that describes the behavior of the overall system.
Definition 1. Given all the functions introduced in the previous section, the
hybrid automaton describing the system is a 4-tuple H = 〈Q,Θ,D, T 〉 that
is defined as follows:
(i) Q = Sa × Se ×G⊥ × P is the state space of the automaton.
(ii) Θ ⊆ Q is the set of initial states.
(iii) T is a set of trajectories for Q. Along any trajectory ξ ∈ T , the
environment state, the planner, and the goal remain constant and only
the agent state evolves continuously.
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(iv) D ⊆ Q × {env, pln, repln} × Q is the set of discrete transitions. A
(q, `, q′) ∈ D iff one of the following conditions hold:
(a) (environment transition) If ` = env and time-elapsed in q1 since the
last environment transition is τ then a transition is enabled. The
post-state of the transition updates q′.Se ∈ En(q.Se), and all other
components, remain unchanged, i.e., q′.Sa = q.Sa, q′.G = q.G, and
q′.Pl = q.Pl.
(b) (planner transition) If ` = pln, q.G 6=⊥ and q.Sa ∈ Grd(q.G), a
transition is enabled. The agent and environment states get up-
dated: (q′.Sa, q′.Se) = AE(q.Sa, q.Se, q.G). Moreover, the planner
gets updated as:
q′.Pl = Le(q.Pl,Obs(q.Sa), q.Se, q.G).
Let o′a = Obs(q
′.Sa) and g = q′.Pl(o′a, q
′.Se, q.G). If Sh(o′a, q
′.Se, g) =
safe, then q′.G = g. Otherwise q′.G =⊥.
(c) (re-plan transition) If ` = repln and q.G =⊥, a transition is en-
abled. The agent and environment states stay constant. Let oa =
Obs(q.Sa), then the planner gets updated as:
q′.Pl = Le(q.Pl, oa, q.Se,⊥),
Let g = q′.Pl(oa, q.Se,⊥). If Sh(oa, q.Se, g) = safe, the goal is up-
dated as q′.G = g. Otherwise, the goal is kept ⊥.
A few remarks on Definition 1. First, discrete state space and periodic up-
date model for the environment is an abstraction of sensing and perception
modules of the agent. These modules collect and fuse information, possi-
bly from distributed sensors, and present a view of the environment to the
decision-making modules in the agent, namely the planner.
Second, for any trajectory ξ ∈ T , the goal, planner, and environment re-
main constant. That is, at any time t ∈ dom(ξ), ξ(t).G = ξ(0).G, ξ(t).Pl =
ξ(0).Pl, ξ(t).Se = ξ(0).Se, and ξ(t).Sa changes continuously with time. In
special cases, we may assume that the ξ(t).Sa is a solution of a known dif-
ferential equation. That is, for a given starting state q0 ∈ Q with q0.G 6=⊥,
1This is checked with a timer variable that is omitted in the definition.
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the function ξ(·).Sa satisfies the differential equation:
d
dt
(ξ(t).Sa) = fq0.G(ξ(t).Sa), (3.1)
with ξ(0).Sa = q0.Sa. The dynamics of the low-level controller may depend
on the chosen goal, and hence, the right-hand side of the ODE (3.1) depends
on q0.G.
Definition 2. A hybrid automaton of Definition 1 is said to be goal-tracking
if for each g ∈ G, for every trajectory ξ ∈ T with ξ(0).G = g, there exists a
time T ∗ such that ξ(T ∗).Sa ∈ Grd(g) and for all t > T ∗, ξ(t).Sa ∈ Grd(g).
The goal tracking property ensures that once a goal g ∈ G is set by the
planner, the low-level controller of the agent drives the agent state sa to the
corresponding set Grd(g).
The final remark is about the transitions. There are three types of discrete
transitions in the hybrid automaton of Definition 1. All of these types of
transitions are mutually exclusive and urgent; that is, at most one of them is
enabled in any given state, and they do indeed occur as soon as they become
enabled [41].
First, environment transitions (env) are enabled every τ > 0 time, and
when the transition occurs, the discrete state of the environment se is up-
dated, possibly nondeterministically, according to the environment update
function En.
Second, planner transitions (pln) are enabled at a state q iff q.G 6=⊥ and
q.Sa ∈ Grd(q.G). The state of the environment and the agent get updated,
possibly nondeterministically, according to the joint update function AE.
Furthermore, the learner Le updates the planner based on the current ob-
served state and the achieved goal. If the new planner q′.Pl provides a safe
goal g ∈ G for the new state, the goal gets updated to g. Otherwise, the goal
gets updated to ⊥ to indicate further updates for the planner are needed.
These updates would be handled by the third type.
Third, re-plan transitions (repln) are enabled at a state q iff q.G =⊥. The
environment and agent states do not change. The aim of this transition is to
update the planner to provide a safe goal for the current state. Hence, the
planner gets updated by Le. Then, its goal g for the current observed state
is checked if safe by Sh. If safe, the goal gets updated to g. Otherwise, it
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stays ⊥ to allow further updates of the planner until one with a safe goal is
reached.
3.5 Semantics and Safety
The semantics of our hybrid model is defined in the usual fashion [42, 43].
An execution fragment of H is an alternating sequence of trajectories and
transition labels, α = ξ0`1ξ1`2 . . . ξk, where each ξi ∈ T , `i ∈ {env, pln, repln}
and (ξi.lstate, `i+1, ξi+1.fstate) ∈ D. The first state of an execution is defined
as α.fstate = ξ0.fstate. An execution fragment α is an execution if it starts
from the initial set, that is, α.fstate ∈ Θ. An execution fragment is closed if
it is a finite sequence and all the trajectories have finite domain. Since we
are interested in bounded time analysis, we only consider closed executions
of H in this paper. The duration of a (closed) execution fragment α, denoted
by α.dur , is the sum of the duration ocf all its trajectories. The last state
of a closed trajectory α = ξ0`1 . . . ξk, is the last state of the last trajectory
ξk in α, that is, α.lstate = ξk.lstate. Notice that some trajectories may be
of duration 0 or equivalently, a sequence of action can occur in 0 time. In
fact, in the H automaton defined above, a pln action may be followed by a
sequence of repln actions, in 0 time. Nevertheless, we can define α(t), that
is, the state of H at time t, where 0 ≤ t ≤ α.dur in the standard way as
α′.lstate where α′ is the longest prefix of α with duration t [43].
A state q ∈ Q is reachable from a set of states Q0 ⊆ Q if there exists a
closed execution fragment α such that α.fstate ∈ Q0 and α.lstate ∈ Q. The
set of all reachable states from Q0 is denoted by ReachH(Q0). For ReachH(Θ)
we simply write ReachH or Reach. A state q is reachable within time T ≥
0 from Q0 if there exists a closed execution fragment α with α.dur ≤ T ,
α.fstate ∈ Q0, and α.lstate ∈ Q. The bounded time reachable sets from Q0
and Θ within time bound T , are defined analogously and are denoted by
ReachH(Q0, T ) and ReachH(Θ, T ), or in the latter case simply by Reach(T ).
Problem Statement. We say that H achieves its mission S∗e if for each
execution α there is a time t∗ such that for all t ≥ t∗, α(t).Se ∈ S∗e . We say
H is safe with respect to U if (ReachH(Θ).Sa,ReachH(Θ).Se) ∩ U = ∅.
19
Given all parameters of the hybrid system H except Sh and Le, and given
the requirements (S∗e , U), our goal is to design a learner Le and a shield Sh,
such that the resulting H is safe and achieves its mission.
There are several other performance-related requirements we would like
the Sh and Le to have2 For example, Sh should be computationally effective,
as it is called in run-time whenever a new goal is chosen by the planner, and
Le should be able to give another planner that provides a safe goal if the
previous planner goal was not safe. In other words, it should not have many
repln transitions.
2The solution proposed in this paper does not address this wish list of performance
requirements.
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Chapter 4
FIRE-FIGHTING CASE STUDY
We consider the fire-fighting case study briefly mentioned in the introduction
(Figure 4.1). The agent being controlled is a drone described by continuous-
time dynamics. Its mission is to extinguish a forest fire that is sensed as a
2-dimensional grid-world environment. The drone has a water tank of limited
capacity and therefore has to incrementally douse the fire by flying between
a water source(s) and locations currently aflame, all the while avoiding ob-
stacles scattered around in the environment.
We would like to use reinforcement learning for computing a high-level
planner for the drone. We assume that the drone has a low-level controller
that satisfies the tracking property (Definition 2), that is, it can effectively
track the goals set by the planner within some tolerance.
4.1 Drone (Agent) Model
The drone is a quadcopter that has been outfitted with a water tank of
limited capacity. Its flight dynamics adhere to those outlined in [15, 44] and
are described below.
4.1.1 Drone dynamics model
The drone’s state space is Sa = R9 × {Emp,Full}. Let r = [x, y, z]T be the
position of the center of mass in R3, r˙ its velocity, r¨ its acceleration, m the
mass, c the gravitational acceleration, e3 = [0, 0, 1]
T , φ the roll angle, θ the
pitch angle, ψ the yaw angle, w ∈ {Emp,Full} the state of the water tank if its
empty or full, γ the thrust input, and ω = [ωx, ωy, ωz]
T the body rotational
rates control input. The drone state vector would be sa = (r, r˙, θ, φ, ψ, w)
and its control input would be (γ, ω). Its dynamics then follows the following
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differential equation:
r¨ = ce3 +
1
m
Je3γ,
where J is the rotation matrix from the body frame to the world frame and
is defined as follows:
J =

cθcψ sφsθcψ − cφsψ cφsθcψ + sφsψ
cθsψ sφsθsψ + cφcψ cφsθsψ − sφcψ
−sθ sφcθ cφcθ
 ,
and cθ and sθ correspond to cos θ and sin θ, respectively. Moreover,
φ˙
θ˙
ψ˙
 =

1 sin(φ) tan(θ) cos(φ) tan(θ)
0 cos(φ) − sin(φ)
0 sin(φ) sec(θ) cos(φ) sec(θ)
ω.
The control input is the sum of a feed-forward and feed-back control inputs
described below.
4.1.2 Feed-forward controller
As stated in [15], the drone dynamics are differentially flat with flat out-
put η = [rᵀ, ψᵀ]ᵀ. That means that the state q and the control (γ, ω) can
be represented as an algebraic function of [η, η˙, η¨,
...
η ]. Given a three times
differentiable desired trajectory ηd = [r
ᵀ
d, ψ
ᵀ
d ]
ᵀ ∈ C3 that we want the drone
state to follow, one can derive the feed-forward controller to get:
γff = −m ‖r¨d − ce3‖ , and
ω1,ff
ω2,ff
ω3,ff
 =

1 0 sin(θd)
0 cos(φd) sin(φd) cos(θd)
0 − sin(φd) cos(φd) cos(θd)
 ,
where θd = atan2(βa, βb), φd = atan2(βc,
√
(β2a + β
2
b )), βa = x¨d cos(ψd) −
y¨d sin(ψd), βb = −z¨d + c, and βc = x¨d sin(ψd) + y¨d cos(ψd) [15]. The desired
trajectory is computed based on the drone initial state sa ∈ Sa and its goal
state s′a ∈ Sa.
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4.1.3 Feed-back controller
The feed-forward controller designed using differential flatness may not be
sufficient as there may be modeling and tracking errors. These would be han-
dled using a feed-back controller that aims to minimize the distance between
the desired and actual trajectories. The components are as follows:
γfb = Kp〈Je3, rd − r〉+Kd〈Je3, r˙d − r˙〉, and
ω1,fb
ω2,fb
ω3,fb
 = Kp

φd − φ
θd − θ
ψd − ψ
+Kd

φ˙d − φ˙
θ˙d − θ˙
ψ˙d − ψ˙
+ K¯p

yd − y
xd − x
0
 ,
The control input would be [γff + γfb , ωff + ωfb ].
In summary, once a goal state is chosen, a desired trajectory to get there
from the current state is computed, and the dynamics become autonomous
till reaching the goal state as the controller can be considered part of the
dynamics. Finally, the water tank state w has zero dynamics.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of fire-fighting scenario
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4.1.4 Environment Model
The environment is modeled as a 2-dimensional grid with n cells over a
bounded rectangle (see Figure 6.1). For a 4 × 4 environment n = 16. Each
of the n cells can be in one of eight discrete states (as sensed by the drone,
for instance through satellite imaging):
• FIRE{1,2,3,4} - currently on fire at one of four intensities
• UNLIT{5} - not currently on fire but may catch on fire
• EXTINGUISHED{6} - extinguished fire that cannot be ignited
• OBSTACLE{7} - any type of obstacle for the drone
• WATER{8} - source of water
Hence, the environment state space is Se = [8]
n.
Now we describe the environment transition function En. Only a cell with
a FIRE or UNLIT state would change state either because of fire propagation
or because of water thrown by the drone. The fire propagates in the grid
as a 2-dimensional convolution between a 2-dimensional kernel, called an
influence matrix, and the environment. The influence matrix models an
exogenous input like wind and is unknown to learner and the shield, but
its effect on the state can be observed by the learner. More precisely, the
environment update function En is defined as follows: At each cell in the
environment, if it has a state of 5 or less, its updated state is the sum of
the point-wise product between the influence matrix centered at it and the
states of the cells of the environment while considering the state of any cell
with a state larger than 4 as zero. Cells with states larger than 5 are kept
unchanged.
In this thesis, we implemented our approach to only handle static obstacles;
however, moving obstacles with (possibly nondeterministic) models could
also be captured in En.
4.1.5 The System as a Hybrid Automaton
In this section, we will define all the sets and maps of the hybrid automaton
H in Definition 1 for this case study except Sh and Le, which will be discussed
separately in Chapter 5.
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First, each grid cell of the environment is considered a goal. Hence, the
goal set G is [n]. Moreover, the observation map Obs : Sa → Oa := [n] ×
{Emp,Full} maps any drone state sa ∈ Sa to the cell in the environment grid
that the drone is currently in and its water tank state. The set of planners P
we consider is the set of all functions (to be implemented as neural networks)
that take as input the observed drone state oa ∈ Oa and the state of the
environment se ∈ Se and output a cell in [n] that the drone should go to.
This set of planners ignores the current goal from the computation of a new
one. We will further restrict this set to be networks with fixed architecture
in Section 6.3. Overall, the state space of H is Q = R9 × {Emp,Full} × [n]×
{[n] ∪ ⊥} × [n]× P .
The Grd is defined as follows: For each goal/cell g ∈ G, Grd(g) is an
axis-parallel hyperrectangle in R9×{Emp,Full} with the first two dimensions
being a rectangle centered around the center of the corresponding cell.
The agent-environment joint update function AE is defined as follows: If
the cell is a source of water, w gets mapped to Full while the environment
state does not change. If the drone has w = Full and it resides in a cell with
a state of FIRE of intensity larger than 1, w gets mapped to Emp and the
cell fire intensity is decreased by 1. If instead the cell has a fire intensity of
1, it gets mapped to EXTINGUISHED state. For all other states, neither
the drone nor the environment state changes. The initial set of states Θ is
the set of all states with sa ∈ ∪g∈GGrd(g) and an environment state se with
a single cell with a FIRE state and at least one source of water.
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Chapter 5
FORSHIELD FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, we describe our approach FoRShield for implementing Sh and
Le. There are two main challenges that an implementation of a Sh should
tackle: (a) the agent has continuous-time possibly nonlinear dynamics as
the drone of Section 4.1, and (b) many states of the agent map to the same
observed state.
A shield Sh when called on an observed state o ∈ O and a goal g ∈ G
should check if any execution fragment of H (continuous dynamics of the
agent and the discrete dynamics of the environment) can lead to unsafe states
(U), starting from any state in Obs−1(o), and anytime before the fragment
reaches Grd(g).
5.1 Algorithm for Shield
Let Q0 ⊆ Q and assume that all q ∈ Q0 have q.G = g, for some g ∈
G. The set of reachable states by executions starting from Q0 till the
first planner transition, i.e., till all executions reach Grd(g), is denoted by
GoalReachH(Q0, g). If the set of agent states Qa,0 in Q0 is compact, there
exists a T > 0 such that all executions starting from Q0 would have reached
their first pln transition. Then, ReachH(Q0, T ) ⊇ GoalReachH(Q0). Note that
GoalReachH(Q0) does not depend on the planner part of the states and all
of its states have the same goal. Only the environment and agent states are
the important information that are sought from computing such a set. More-
over, the dynamics of the agent and the environment are independent from
each other in this set since they are only updated in a pln transition. Hence,
one can compute the set of reachable states by the agent independently from
those of the environment.
We introduce our approach that implements the Sh using reach set com-
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putation. For any oa ∈ Oa, se ∈ Se, g ∈ G, and p ∈ Pl, let Q0 be the set of all
states q with q.Sa ∈ Obs−1(oa), q.Se = Se, q.G = g, and arbitrary planners.
To check the safety of having goal g at observed state (oa, se), one would com-
pute GoalReachH(Q0). If it intersects U , it would return unsafe resembling
the goal is unsafe. Otherwise, it would return safe. However, computing
reach sets in all forms is computationally hard in general. Fortunately, there
are several libraries and tools that can robustly over-approximate bounded
time reach sets for nonlinear and hybrid models [45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51].
Sh would over-approximate computations of GoalReachH(Q0) by computing
over-approximations of bounded time reach sets using such tools.
Algorithm 1 Sh implementation
1: input: oa ∈ Oa, se ∈ Se, g ∈ G
2: Fix arbitrary p ∈ P
3: Q0 ← Obs−1(oa)× {se} × {g}, {p}
4: R← Compute over-approximation of GoalReachH(Q0)
5: if R ∩ U = ∅ then
6: return safe
7: else
8: return unsafe
9: end if
As stated in Theorem 1, it can be shown that the hybrid system with a Sh
implemented as above is safe.
Theorem 1. If Sh in H implemented as in Algorithm 1 and initially the
goal is safe, that is, for all q ∈ Θ, Sh(Obs(q.Sa), q.Se, q.G) = safe, then the
overall hybrid system H is safe (with respect to U).
Proof. The bounded-time reachable set computation tool used in FoRShield
is assumed to be sound. In other words, the set it computes should contain
all states that can be reached in the bounded time. Using FoRShield, every
goal executed by H is safe. FoRShield ensures that all possible executions
given the current observed state will reach the Grd of the approved goal
without intersecting with U . Consider any execution α of H. There will be
no state in the prefix of α before the first pln transition that intersects U
by the assumption of the theorem that Sh returned safe and FoRShield over-
approximates the reach set till reaching the first pln transition. By induction
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on the pln transitions of α, consider any such transition and assume that there
was no state reached by α before that belongs to U . Then, if Sh returned
safe on the proposed goal by the new planner, there will be no state reached
by α that belongs to U till the next pln transition by the assumption that
the computed set by FoRShield solver over-approximates the reach set till the
goal is achieved. If it returned unsafe, the goal would be set to ⊥. Moreover,
a sequence of repln transitions would occur till a planner that provides a goal
that is checked by Sh to be safe is reached. During these transitions, the
agent and environment state would not change. Hence, it will be safe by the
induction assumption. Once the planner with the checked goal to be safe is
reached, the execution will be safe till the next pln transition by, again, the
fact that the computed set by FoRShield over-approximates the actual reach
set.
5.2 Faster Unsound Approaches
We introduce two alternative approaches that are computationally more ef-
ficient but less accurate than Algorithm 1. These alternatives will serve as
baseline comparison points for our experiments.
• Sim. Given an observed agent state oa ∈ Oa, environment state se ∈ Se,
and a goal g ∈ G, we choose an arbitrary sa ∈ Obs−1(oa). Then, we
forward simulate (Sim) the state using E for the environment state and
by solving the O.D.E in Equation 3.1 till it reaches Grd(g) or U for the
agent state. If U has been reached, Sh reports unsafe, otherwise, safe.
• Line. Given the current agent state sa choose an arbitrary s′a ∈ Grd(g)
and connect sa and s
′
a by a straight line. The environment state is still
evolved using E . If the straight line along with the environment state
intersects U , Sh would report unsafe, otherwise, safe.
Both approaches are not sound: they may report safe for unsafe execu-
tions and vice versa. However, they are usually much faster than computing
reachsets.
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5.3 Shield and Learner Implementation Pragmatics
FoRShield can be implemented in two ways. The first way aims to improve
time efficiency at run time. FoRShield would do all the computations oﬄine.
Specifically, for any pair of goals g, g′ ∈ G, an over-approximation of the
GoalReach with initial set of the agent being Grd(g) and goal being g′ is
computed oﬄine. Also, for each initial goal in Θ, an over-approximation
for the reach set with initial set being the set of states in Θ with that goal
is computed. All the results of the computations are cached. During run
time, whenever Sh is called, FoRShield would propagate the dynamics of the
environment using E and use the corresponding cached reach tube of the
agent to check if they intersect U .
The second way is the default way. No computations happen oﬄine. In-
stead, whenever Sh is called, FoRShield would compute the reach tube of the
agent dynamics and propagate the environment dynamics using E and then
checks the intersection with U .
Furthermore, for the Le end, we would design a reward function that maps
the observed state and goal to a scalar. Then, we use a reinforcement learn-
ing algorithm to update the current planner based on the reported reward.
In repln transitions, a −∞ reward is reported so that ln would change the
planner to not choose that goal again since it is unsafe.
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Chapter 6
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this chapter, we present the experimental results and discuss the imple-
mentation of FoRShield. Section 6.1 presents five different instances of the
fire-fighting case study introduced in Chapter 4. Experimental results of
the application of FoRShield to all the scenarios are discussed in Section 6.2.
Lastly, the implementation for FoRShield is detailed in Section 6.3.
6.1 Scenarios
Each of the five scenarios tested against FoRShield is described below.
6.1.1 Scenario 1
In the scenario illustrated in Figure 6.1, the drone starts out in the upper
left-hand corner of the 4 × 4 environment at (0, 0). There is a water source
located in the upper right-hand corner at (0, 3). There is a single stationary
fire of intensity 4 in the lower left-hand corner at (3, 0). A single obstacle
stands in the direct path between the water source and the fire at (1, 2). To
solve this scenario, the drone has to learn how to avoid the obstacle in at
least one additional step.
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Figure 6.1: Scenario 1
6.1.2 Scenario 2
This scenario, illustrated in Figure 6.2, is the same as Scenario 1 but now
the initial fire of intensity 4 at (3, 0) spreads rightward across the bottom.
The ideal solution to this scenario is to put out the fire that will spread to
(3, 1) to prevent the fire from spreading further and incrementally put out
the original fire.
Figure 6.2: Scenario 2
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6.1.3 Scenario 3
In the scenario illustrated in Figure 6.3, the drone starts out in the upper
left-hand corner of the 4 × 4 environment at (0, 0). There is a single water
source located in the upper right-hand corner at (0, 3). There is a single
stationary fire of intensity 4 at (3, 2) surrounded by multiple obstacles that
block the direct path between the fire and the water. This scenario is similar
to Scenario 1 but requires either 2 or 3 hops between the fire and the water
depending on the dynamics of the agent.
Figure 6.3: Scenario 3
6.1.4 Scenario 4
In the scenario illustrated in Figure 6.4, the drone starts out in the upper left-
hand corner of the 4×4 environment at (0, 0). There is a single water source
located in the upper right-hand corner at (0, 3). There is a fire of intensity 4
at (3, 2) that spreads leftward across the bottom row. This scenario is a more
complicated version of Scenario 2 because similar to Scenario 3, it requires
extra actions by the agent each time it moves between the fire and water.
The best solution to this scenario is for the drone to again put out the fire
that spreads to (3, 1) first to prevent the fire from spreading to (3, 0) and
then incrementally put out the original fire at (3, 2).
32
Figure 6.4: Scenario 4
6.1.5 Scenario 5
In the scenario illustrated in Figure 6.5, the drone starts out in the upper
left-hand corner of the 4 × 4 environment at (0, 0). There is a single water
source located in the upper right-hand corner at (0, 3). There are three
obstacles that line the rightmost column underneath the water source. A fire
of intensity 4 starts at (1, 2) and spreads in two directions, downward and
leftward. This is by far the most complicated scenario with the largest state
space because the majority of cells may be affected by the fire spread. The
optimal solution is to put out the spreading fire at (1, 1) and (2, 2) first to
prevent the fire from spreading to any other cells and then incrementally put
out the original fire.
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Figure 6.5: Scenario 5
6.2 Experimental Results
We evaluated the FoRShield approach presented in Chapters 3 and 5 against
five instances of the fire-fighting case study described in Chapter 4. For each
of the instances, we compare FoRShield with two other methods introduced
in Section 5.2, to demonstrate the efficacy of FoRShield in controlling a drone
safely around obstacles and achieving the mission target.
The data from these experiments are shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. All
experiments were run on a laptop equipped with an Intel Core i5-6200U
CPU and 8 GBs of RAM. The key observations from these experiments are
as follows.
Table 6.1: Run-time results across different scenarios using FoRShield (FSh),
line simulation (Line), and forward simulation (Sim)
Experiments
Scenarios
Verification time (hh:mm:ss) Training time (hh:mm:ss)
Line Sim FSh Line Sim FSh
Scenario 1 00:07:57 00:05:35 00:21:40 01:16:16 00:54:43 02:09:41
Scenario 2 02:36:58 09:56:31 00:21:40 15:42:58 15:29:51 05:05:29
Scenario 3 01:45:39 01:42:50 00:21:16 02:14:13 02:03:22 08:54:06
Scenario 4 03:40:38 03:02:17 00:07:16 07:32:20 04:13:00 04:42:26
Scenario 5 - - 00:12:44 - - 187:02:49
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Table 6.2: Trajectory and verification results across different scenarios
using FoRShield (FSh), line simulation (Line), and forward simulation (Sim)
Experiments
Scenarios
Total verifications Unsafe verifications Unsafe trajectories
Line Sim FSh Line Sim FSh Line Sim FSh
Scenario 1 26431 18809 256 4334 2851 132 34 20 0
Scenario 2 575934 487482 256* 52878 9301 132* 3560 361 0
Scenario 3 68929 56071 256 14343 10452 195 2792 1136 0
Scenario 4 244611 136335 256 15682 11080 156 4 397 0
Scenario 5 - - 256 - - 109 - - 0
Learned planners are near-optimal. Across all the scenarios except
for the last one, FoRShield learned near-optimal planners if not an optimal
planner, completing the mission target of putting out the fire in the shortest
time possible. In fact, both the unsound strategies, Line and Sim, also found
near optimal planners. The scenarios used in these experiments are small
enough that the optimality of the strategies can be derived empirically, but
these results will carry-over to more complicated scenarios as well. In order
for the RL algorithm to maximize the total reward per episode, it inherently
needs to converge to a policy with minimal time.
The introduction of a fire propagating in two directions in Scenario 5
greatly increased the state space of the problem. In Scenario 1, the complete
state space is 5×42×2 = 160 where 5 is the number of states the burning cell
may take, 42 for the current location of the agent in the environment, and 2
to indicate whether the agent has any water. In contrast, in Scenario 5, the
state space blows up to slightly less than 59 × 42 × 2 = 62, 500, 000 due to
the increase in cells that may catch fire. Due to the predefined episode limit,
the agent was unable to learn a viable policy to extinguish a fire; however,
if the agent was allowed to train sufficiently longer, it would have definitely
discovered an optimal policy as indicated by the increase in rewards over the
training period.
Execution of Line against Scenario 5 was attempted but the learning pro-
cess eventually halted as it became stuck in particular episode and did not
make any progress after one day. Due to this issue, Sim was not run against
Scenario 5. Even though neither of these strategies were tested, it can be
expected that similar results would be achieved as prior scenarios.
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Safe RL with FoRShield is feasible. FoRShield always performed the
smallest number of verifications and encountered the minimal number of un-
safe verifications because it cached its reach-set computations, whereas Line
and Sim are necessarily online methods and verified every action the agent
performed. Additionally, as expected, FoRShield completely eliminated the
risk of the agent ever performing any unsafe actions during training while
this was not the case for Line and Sim where multiple unsafe actions were
taken.
FoRShield’s total running time decreases with scenario complexity.
The verification running time of FoRShield remains mostly constant across
all the scenarios. The decrease in verification time for later scenarios can
be attributed to an increase in unsafe cells which reduces the number of
times refinement computations are necessary. Compared to the Line and Sim
strategies, FoRShield tends to be slower for simpler scenarios where verify-
ing the environment takes longer than just running verifications online with
each action execution, but this trend reverses for more complex examples
where many more actions are performed. By caching its verification results,
FoRShield just does simple look-ups to check whether a particular action is
safe to execute.
In general, it is difficult to make any comparisons in training time across
the three strategies because the time is highly correlated with initialization
of the networks which is random. This may explain the enormous differences
in training times particularly in Scenarios 2 and 3. In order to make a fair
comparison, it would be necessary to rerun all the strategies for each of the
Scenarios multiple times.
6.3 Implementation Details
The FoRShield framework—the shield, environment, agent, and learner—
is implemented in Python and uses a variety of modules such as Numpy,
TensorFlow, and OpenAI Gym to name a few. FoRShield and the Sim method
both utilize DryVR [52] as a verification back-end to simulate the continuous
dynamics of the drone model while Line uses a simple intersection algorithm.
The fire-fighting environment and learner were both derived from existing
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implementations and modified accordingly for the specific requirements of
the framework.
For all our experiments, the learner is an instance of an actor-critic al-
gorithm. Our implementation of the algorithm uses two separate networks,
one each for the actor and the critic. Both the actor and critic networks are
described in more detail below.
The actor network is a 4-layered fully connected neural network with 256
nodes in the first hidden layer, 128 nodes in the second hidden layer, 64
nodes in the third hidden layer and a variable number of nodes in the output
depending on the dimensions of the environment. Each of the hidden layers
is equipped with the ReLu function and the output layer utilizes the softmax
function. Given an environment of size (r × c), the output layer has a total
of r+ c nodes of which r nodes correspond to selecting a particular row and
c nodes correspond to selecting a particular column. Each set of r and n
nodes utilizes its own softmax function to compute a particular coordinate
destination that the agent should navigate to.
The critic network is a 3-layered fully connected neural network with 128
nodes in the first hidden layer, 64 nodes in the second hidden layer, and a
single node in the output layer. Each of the hidden layers is equipped with
the ReLu function, and the output layer uses a plain linear function.
To create a modular system, the framework separates each of the major
components into individual modules that are linked together in the experi-
ment section.
Figure 6.6: Modular software architecture
Similar to the pre- and post- placements of the shield in [34], the veri-
fication of the environment can happen in three distinct locations: before
(pre-), during (peri-), or after (post-) the training of the fire-fighting pol-
icy by the agent. In the above experiments, the FSh approach utilized the
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pre-verification algorithm while Line and Sim utilized the peri-verification al-
gorithm. Following are a brief explanation and diagram for each algorithm.
6.3.1 Pre-verification Algorithm
In this setup shown in Figure 6.7, the environment is verified beforehand and
the results are cached into either a data-structure or file. During training,
only a simple lookup is required to get the results.
Figure 6.7: Diagram of the pre-verification algorithm
Suppose that at time t, the algorithm has just completed a single iteration
of training and is about to begin the next one. The training loop then runs
as follows:
1. The state at time t, st, is fed into the actor network.
2. The actor network processes st and proposed an action at that is sent
to the environment.
3. The environment checks whether the proposed action is safe against
cached verification results. If the action is safe, it is executed and the
environment is updated accordingly; otherwise no action is taken and a
large negative reward is output. In either case, the environment returns
the next state st+1 and the reward rt to the critic.
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4. The critic computes an advantage at using st, st+1, and rt. This ad-
vantage is used to compute the loss function to update both the actor
and critic networks.
6.3.2 Peri-verification Algorithm
In this setup shown in Figure 6.8, the environment is verified online during
training. Each time the agent proposes an action, the action will first be
verified to check its safety.
Figure 6.8: Diagram of peri-verification algorithm
Suppose that at time t, the algorithm has just completed a single iteration
of training and is about to begin the next one. The training loop then runs
as follows:
1. The state at time t, st, is fed into the actor network.
2. The actor network processes st and proposes an action at that is sent
to DryVR to verify whether the action is safe.
3a. If DryVR verifies the proposed action to be unsafe, a large negative
reward is passed to the environment.
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3b. If DryVR verifies the proposed action to be safe, the action passes
through to the environment.
4. In either of the previous cases, the environment returns the next state
st+1 and the reward rt to the critic.
5. The critic computes an advantage at using st, st+1, and rt. This ad-
vantage is used to compute the loss function to update both the actor
and critic networks.
6.3.3 Post-verification Algorithm
In this setup shown in Figure 6.9, a policy is first learned by the agent. Once
the full training phase has completed, the resultant policy is verified to check
whether it violates any safety constraints. If any action is unsafe, that action
is marked as unsafe and the agent will relearn a completely new policy.
Figure 6.9: Diagram of post-verification algorithm
Suppose that at time t, the algorithm has just finished verifying a policy
and determined that the policy is unsafe.
1. A policy is learned in the training phase similarly as in pre-verification
but the only cached verification results are the concatenations of the
previous results from the verification phase.
2. Once a policy has been learned in the training phase, it is passed to the
verification phase to check whether any of the actions in the policy vio-
late any safety constraints. If so, then violating action will be recorded
in the cached results and a new policy will be learned with new addi-
tion in mind; otherwise, the algorithm will terminate and output the
learned policy.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As machine learning becomes an integral part of CPS products, it will become
necessary to develop methods for specifying hard safety constraints that these
systems must not violate and for verifying their correctness. Researchers have
started focusing their attention on this issues as outlined in the first chapter.
In this thesis, we introduced FoRShield, a step toward realizing such meth-
ods. FoRShield is a framework for learning safe and near-optimal policies,
particularly for agents with nonlinear continuous dynamics. We developed a
formal specification of this framework and illustrated its use in a fire-fighting
case study. Our experiments demonstrate that FoRShield is a viable approach
capable of functioning in environments with large state spaces. We have pre-
liminary results showing that FoRShield can discover nontrivial strategies for
putting out a moving fire around obstacles.
There are multiple directions to explore within the FoRShield framework.
The first is to improve the learning algorithm to be able to handle more com-
plex environments. Although the current implementation is able to handle
relatively complex environments as demonstrated in the experiments, it takes
a long time to learn optimal policies. The second direction is to increase the
complexity of the discrete environment dynamics to include events such as the
depletion of water source(s) and movement of obstacles. Along these lines,
the formal framework can be extended to handle environments that evolve
according to continuous dynamics rather than just the discrete ones. Such
a modeling scheme would allow us to capture more real-world scenarios. A
third direction is to study strategies for coordinating multiple agents toward
a shared mission target. Developing safe coordination techniques would be
applicable to examples such as intersection crossings of autonomous vehicles
with minimal wait time.
A closely related research direction that is worth exploring is multi-objective
reinforcement learning (MoRL). In MoRL, agents attempt to learn policies
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that necessarily optimize for multiple, possibly contradicting, objectives. De-
pending on the problem, safe RL can be framed as a MoRL problem, where
the agent is trying to maximize its safety (or alternatively, minimize its risk)
while simultaneously maximizing some reward. Current MoRL theories can-
not handle objectives that are non-linearly related and can only handle linear
combinations of multiple objectives. Any developments in this area would
be a boon for RL, particularly safe RL.
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